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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....

I.

INTRODUCTION

The proper role of religion in public schools has been a topic of
bitter debate for many years. 2 While one group of individuals believes
that there should be a complete separation of church and state,
another group believes that religion should have an integral place in
public education. Although both groups have looked to the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the First Amendment to
support their respective positions, each has been unable to find clear,
definitive support regarding the appropriate relationship between
religion and public schools, as there was no public education system at
that time. 3 One major issue that has arisen in the context of this
controversy involves state statutes requiring public school students to
observe a "moment of silence" at the beginning of each school day. 4
Both opponents and supporters of religion in public schools
have openly criticized these laws. Opponents of religion in public
schools argue that the moment of silence statutes are a surreptitious
attempt to reintroduce prayer into public schools and that these laws
therefore violate the Establishment Clause. 5 Meanwhile, those who
1.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2.
"The Court's historic duty to expound the meaning of the Constitution has encountered
few issues more intricate or more demanding than that of the relationship between religion and
the public schools." Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
3.
2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 645 (2d ed. 1995) ("[T]here
was no controversy over school prayer (during the founding period) because there was no system
of public education.").
4.
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-61 (1985) (striking down an Alabama statute
that provided for a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" because the statute
had no secular purpose and it was clear from the statute's legislative history that its sole purpose
was to reintroduce prayer to the public schools); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 277 (4th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001) (upholding Virginia's statute that mandated a "minute of
silence" during which time a child could engage in any activity, including meditation or prayer,
so long as it was silent, because there was clearly a secular purpose and because the presence of
another arguably secular purpose that addressed religion did not invalidate the statute); Bown v.
Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1474 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding Georgia's statute
that provided for a "moment of quiet reflection" because it satisfied the three-prong Lemon test);
May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 245, 253 (3d Cir. 1985) (striking down a New Jersey law that
permitted public schools to implement a minute of silence to be observed by students as they
chose as long as they remained silent); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schs., 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1015,
1020 (D.N.M. 1983) (striking down a statute authorizing local school boards to institute a
moment of silence because the statute had no clear secular purpose); Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F.
Supp. 337, 339, 346 (D. Mass. 1976) (upholding Massachusetts statute that called for a moment
of silence because the law was noncompulsory and had a secular purpose).
5.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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support religious activity in public schools believe that the statutes do
not adequately satisfy a child's desire to openly engage in religious
expression. Defenders of the statutes have long argued that the laws
neither promote nor inhibit religion and that they are primarily
designed to provide students with a calming environment to
counteract the hectic circumstances in their lives. 6 This Note posits
that a moment of silence statute, when written and administered in a
neutral manner, does not violate the Establishment Clause; rather,
these laws represent a fair compromise between the views of
opponents and supporters of religion in public- schools.
Part II of this Note briefly examines the history of the
Establishment Clause, which opponents of moment of silence statutes
have used to challenge these laws. 7 Part III of this Note outlines the
three levels of scrutiny that the Supreme Court has employed in
deciding Establishment Clause cases. Part IV of this Note traces the
downfall of state-sponsored school prayers and the subsequent
development of the moment of silence statutes. Finally, Part V asserts
that the moment of silence statutes are constitutional and presents a
compromise between the views of those who advocate a complete
separation of church and state and those who support a substantial
presence for religion in the public school system.

II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Text and Legislative History
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion . ...8 Itdoes not specify what
"establishment" means, nor does it specify who should be responsible
for defining the term. 9 To discover the true meaning of the
Establishment Clause, it is therefore necessary to look to the history
of the First Amendment in addition to the text.
The Founding Fathers' ancestors fled from England to escape
religious intolerance and persecution. 10 Despite this history, most of
6.
See, e.g., Bown, 112 F.3d at 1467 (pointing out that the primary sponsor of Georgia's
statute maintained that he had introduced the law as a means for students to utilize the period
as a calming mechanism to combat violence).
7.
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 42-43. A moment of silence statute is not a free speech problem
because speech is not being implicated through silent prayer. Similarly, the Free Exercise Clause
is also not a concern, because there is no challenge to the right of students to pray silently.
8.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9.

O'BRIEN, supra note 3,at 644-45.

10. See id. at 645 (noting that colonial settlements were "populated by many escaping
religious persecution in England or on the European continent").
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the colonial settlements were dominated by a particular religion, and
the governments of those colonies discriminated against other faiths. 1
However, the Founding Fathers did not forget the persecution of their
ancestors and penned the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution to prevent the establishment of an official religion in the
new nation. 12 During the Constitutional Convention, the Framers
considered inserting a provision guaranteeing freedom of religion. On
June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed the following amendments to
the House of Representatives:
The Civil Rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed. No State shall violate the
equal 13rights of conscience, or freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal
cases.

After being debated by the House, the proposals were revised to
read:
Congress shall make no law establishing religion, 14or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed.

Once the amendment reached the Senate, the Senate voted
that the amendment state:
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or
prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 15

This alteration by the Senate only prevented Congress from
endorsing a single denomination or a national religion. 16 Congress
could, however, provide aid to religion as long as it did so in a
nondiscriminatory manner. 17 In exchange for the House's acceptance
of the Senate's versions of other amendments, however, the Senate
approved the House's final version of the religion clauses:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. 18

11. Id. The Congregational Church was established in Massachusetts, while the Church of
England (Anglican) was established in Virginia and four other Southern colonies. Id. Only four
colonies never established a state religion: Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New
Jersey. Id.
12. Id. at 646-48 (discussing the Founding Fathers' desire to guarantee "religious freedom"
in the Constitution).
13. Id. at 647-48.
14. Id. at 648.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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B. The Intent of the Framers:Jefferson vs. Madison
Because the text and legislative history of the Establishment
Clause fail to elucidate the Framers' intentions, scholars seeking to
settle the debate have proposed two possible interpretations of the
Establishment Clause. 19 One group of scholars has directed attention
toward Thomas Jefferson's famous "wall of separation" that
supposedly exists between church and state to support the position
that the First Amendment was intended to prohibit any introduction,
however minute, of religion into the public realm. 20 However,
Jefferson did not write about this "wall" until fourteen years after the
21
First Amendment was passed by Congress and ratified by the states.
In fact, Jefferson was not even in the country when the Bill of Rights
was proposed and enacted. 22 Therefore, Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor concerning the appropriate interplay between church and
state should only be given the attention that is due the observations of
23
a detached observer.
Other scholars have instead looked to James Madison's
writings to support the position that the First Amendment was
designed only to prohibit the creation of a national religion. 24 Unlike
Jefferson, Madison played a substantial role in drafting the Bill of

19. Nancy E. Drane, Comment, The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity: The
Constitutionality of Student-Led Graduation Prayer in Light of the Crumbling Wall Between
Church and State, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 497, 502-03 (2000) ('There was evidence that the
Framers, especially Thomas Jefferson, aimed to build an impenetrable wall separating church
and state. Equally strong historical data suggested that the Clauses simply meant to prohibit the
development of a national religion.").
20. O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 647. Jefferson wrote the following to the Danbury Baptist
Association in 1802:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
god; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the
legislative powers of the government reach actions only and not opinions, I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation
between church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the
nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the
progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights,
convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
21. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
22. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (relating that
Thomas Jefferson was in France during the time of the drafting of the Constitution).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 98 ("It seems indisputable.., that [Madison] saw the Amendment as
designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion .... ).
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Rights. 25 In contrast to Jefferson's advocacy of a wall of separation
between church and state, Madison's original proposal for the First
Amendment only prohibited the establishment of a national religion:
"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief
or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed." 26 Despite several attempts, Madison ultimately
was unable to persuade Congress that the states, and not just the
federal government, should be prohibited from establishing official
religions. 27 Following the adoption of the Bill of Rights, states
continued to retain vestiges of established religion. Massachusetts, for
example, denied Jews the right to hold public office until 1828 and did
not eliminate all vestiges of an established religion until 1833.28 The
Fourteenth Amendment, enacted in 1868, finally applied the First
Amendment to the states.
This brief inquiry into the history of the Establishment Clause
does not definitively clarify the role that the Framers intended for
religion to play in the public realm. Consequently, scholars have
looked beyond the text and history of the Establishment Clause and
have examined the jurisprudence surrounding the clause to gain a
better understanding of the appropriate relationship between church
and state.
III. EVOLUTION OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Building a High Wall of Separation
Although the Establishment Clause was ratified as part of the
First Amendment in 1789, the Supreme Court did not directly
consider its application until 1947 when the Court decided Everson v.
Board of Education.29 In Everson, the Court reviewed a New Jersey
policy allowing the state to reimburse parents for their children's bus
transportation to private, religious, and public schools. 30 The Court
declared its intent to maintain a "wall" between church and state and
expressed concern about the prospect of allowing the state to provide

25. Id. at 92 ("James Madison... play[ed] as large a part as anyone in the drafting of the
Bill of Rights.... [H]e was present in the United States, and he was a leading Member of the
First Congress.").
26.

O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 648.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 647.
Id. at 648.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 3.
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financial assistance to families of children attending religious
schools. 31 Notwithstanding this view, the Court permitted the state to
allocate these subsidies to parents of children who attended religious
schools. 32 In response to the contention that the state was establishing
religion by upholding New Jersey's law, the Court stated that the
First Amendment required that the state be neutral in its relationship
with both religious and nonreligious groups; it did not allow the state
to be hostile toward religion. 33 The Court compared the situation to
one in which state-paid policemen are required to protect children
from traffic dangers when they travel to and from church schools. 34
Thus, although the Court maintained that the wall of separation
between church and state needed to remain in place, it also asserted
that religion must be treated in a neutral manner. 35
The Everson case seemed to indicate that the Court did not
interpret the Establishment Clause to require a strict separation
between church and state, but the Court moved toward this
interpretation in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education.36 In
McCollum, the Court held that an Illinois law allowing religious
classes to be taught in public school buildings violated the
Establishment Clause. 37 Under the Illinois statute, public school
officials were permitted to excuse students from their secular classes
provided that they attended religious classes that were offered at the
school. 38 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, stated that
"[t]he great American principle of eternal separation'.., is one of the
vital reliances of our Constitutional system ....It is the Court's duty
to enforce this principle in its full integrity."39 Thus, the Court
determined that allowing religious classes to be held in publicly
financed buildings and permitting students to attend the religious
40
classes was a violation of the Establishment Clause.

31. Id. at 15, 18.
32. Id. at 16-17.
33. Id. at 18.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1948) ("Zealous
watchfulness against fusion of secular and religious activities by Government itself, through any
of its instruments but especially through its educational agencies, was the democratic response
of the American community to the particular needs of a young and growing nation, unique in the
composition of its people.").
37. Id. at 209-11.
38. Id. at 209-10.
39. Id. at 231.
40. Id. at 212.
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B. Dismantling the Wall of Separation
The Court did not long adhere to the strict separationist view
set forth in McCollum, however, and soon embraced a new stance in
favor of accommodation of religion in public schools. In Zorach v.
Clauson, the Court upheld a New York policy allowing students to be
released from public schools to attend religious classes that were held
off campus. 4 1 The Court distinguished Zorach from McCollum by
pointing out that the religious classes did not take place in a public
school building and that there was no public administrative
involvement in the religious teachings. 42 The Zorach Court further
explained that the policy had only an incidental, and not primary,
effect of aiding religion. 43 Advocating a policy of accommodation of
religion in public schools, the Court repeated the notion set forth in
Everson that the First Amendment did not require the state to be
hostile to religion. 44 Furthermore, Justice Douglas cautioned that
without the accommodation of religious needs, the Court would not
only "show a callous indifference to religious groups," but also to the
45
historical principles upon which the nation was founded.
Thus, from the beginning, the Court appeared to fluctuate
between two applications of the Establishment Clause: one requiring a
rigid partition separating church and state and the other proposing an
accommodation of religion in the public realm. 46 Because the Court
refrained from taking a definitive position, early Establishment
Clause cases did not resolve the question of which view should
ultimately prevail. 47 During the next two decades, the Court would
strive to balance the desire to maintain the separation between church
and state with the need to accommodate religious freedoms in
48
accordance with the First Amendment.

41. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
42. Id. at 315.
43. Id. at 312-14; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975).
44. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("[W]e find no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against
efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.").
45. Id.
46. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 268 (1998) (discussing the two lines of
theories that were espoused by the Court in its decisions regarding Establishment Clause cases).
47. Id. ("In the two decades after Everson, the Court seemed to oscillate between these two
attitudes.").
48. See, e.g., Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313 (advocating a position of accommodation toward
religion in public schools).
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C. The Emergence of the Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court announced a new test 49 to
50
analyze situations in which the state potentially "endorsed" religion.
In Lemon, the Court struck down two state statutes providing tax
dollars to religious schools.5 1 The Court reasoned that this practice
resulted in the inappropriate appearance and effect of government
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement" in religious
activity.5 2 In determining whether a state law involving religion was
constitutional, the Court announced that three criteria had to be met.
First, the state needed to have a "secular legislative purpose"
in enacting the policy.5 3 Here, the Court sought to root out state
policies that, while appearing facially neutral, were actually created to
purposefully promote and sustain religious activity in the public
realm. 54 In ascertaining legislative intent, the Court relied on a
thorough examination of both the text and legislative history of the
statute. 55 If a court finds that a law was not enacted for a secular
purpose, then the inquiry ends, and the state has unconstitutionally
endorsed religion. In the alternative, if the court finds that the law
does have a secular purpose, it must proceed to the next step of the
test.
The second question is whether the primary effect of the law
either advances or inhibits religion.5 6 This inquiry involves a study of
both the practical results of the law as well as public perception of the
57
policy.
Finally, the third inquiry is whether the state, in administering
the policy, creates "an excessive government entanglement with

49. FARBER, supra note 46, at 268 (arguing that the Lemon decision "made sense" of
previous Establishment Clause cases and was a "synthesis" of such precedent); see also Ann E.
Stockman, Comment & Note, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education: The Black
Sheep of Graduation Prayer Cases, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1805, 1812-14 (1999) (declaring that the

Lemon test was the "first comprehensive test" for the Establishment Clause).
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. Id. at 606-07. In Pennsylvania, the state reimbursed nonpublic elementary and
secondary schools for the cost of teachers' salaries, instructional materials and textbooks in
certain secular subjects. Id. Rhode Island supplemented nonpublic elementary school teachers
fifteen percent of their annual salaries. Id.
52. Id. at 612-13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)
(upholding a New York property tax exemption for church and other charitable property because
removal of this traditional exemption would lead to excessive entanglement)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 613.

56.
57.

Id.
Id.
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religion. 5 8s The Court articulated three aspects that needed to be
analyzed to determine whether there was excessive government
entanglement: 1) the character and purposes of the institutions that
the law benefits; 2) the type of aid that is provided by the state; and 3)
the relationship that results between the government and religion
59
from this interaction.
Subsequent cases have clarified the Lemon test. In her
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor sought to
refine the first (purpose) and second (effect) prongs of the Lemon
test. 60 Justice O'Connor proposed that the first prong was a subjective
one: whether or not the government intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion. 6 1 As to the second prong,
Justice O'Connor believed that the appropriate inquiry was an
objective one: whether the law actually has the effect of endorsing or
disapproving of religion. 62 In creating the Lemon test, therefore, the
Court sought to provide a clear guide by which to measure laws
against the Establishment Clause.
D. Other Standards Used for Establishment Clause Cases
In subsequent cases, the Court has demonstrated that if it does
not view the problem as one of endorsement, it will not use the Lemon
test to determine the validity of the laws challenged. Rather, the
Court has applied a variety of other tests to situations in which it does
not consider endorsement to be the main issue.
1. The Coercion Test
In Lee v. Weisman, the Court found that a public school policy
allowing members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at
middle school and high school graduations violated the Establishment
58. Id. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
59. Id. at 615; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 670, 674 (serving as the origin of the third prong of
the Lemon test).
60. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court held that a city's holiday
display which included traditional secular figures like Santa Clause, reindeer, clowns, and
elephants, along with a creche was constitutional. Id. at 671-72.
61. Id. at 691-92. The Wallace Court would later adopt this reasoning when it struck down
Alabama's moment of silence statute. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (citing Lynch,
465 U.S. at 690) ("In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.' ").
62. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that instead of looking to
whether or not the government practice has in fact advanced or inhibited religion, the Court
should focus on whether the activity has "the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion").
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Clause. 63 Although the Court declined to overrule the Lemon test, it
did not use the test in this case. 64 Instead, the Court employed a
"subtle coercion" test to analyze whether the school's policy violated
the Establishment Clause. 65 This analysis required the Court to
examine whether the state intended to encourage religion by forcing
individuals to observe a particular religious practice. 6 6 Recognizing
that graduation ceremonies are in a sense mandatory, the Court
determined that the prayers forced everyone in attendance to
participate in the religious activity merely by virtue of their
67
presence.
2. Historical Practices Test
In Marsh v. Chambers,68 the Court also refused to apply the
Lemon test in deciding to uphold the Nebraska legislature's practice of
opening each session with prayers delivered by a state-employed
chaplain. 69 Instead, the Court examined "historical practice" to find
the Nebraska legislature's activity constitutional. 70 The Court stressed
that prayers had opened legislative sessions since the time of the
Founding Fathers, who found the invocations to be acceptable despite
their conflicting views on religion. 71 By citing the "unique history" of
the role of prayer in legislative sessions, the Court held that the
prayers did not pose a threat to the Establishment Clause because any
72
perceived endorsement was de minimis.

63. 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).
64. Id. at 587.
65. See id. at 588, 593-94.
66. Id. at 587 (holding that a state action is suspect if it has the effect of pressuring people
to attend religious events or prayer services); see also Harlan A. Loeb, Suffering in Silence:
Camouflaging the Redefinition of the Establishment Clause, 77 OR. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (1998)
(arguing that the Establishment Clause has been wrongly eroded and that the different tests
that have been applied by the Court in place of the Lemon test, instead of being used separately,
should be incorporated into the Lemon analysis).
67. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
68. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 786-95. " 'It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in
violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national
existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice ... is not something to be lightly cast
aside.' "Id. at 790 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)).
71. Id. at 792. The Court interpreted the delegates' actions to imply that they "did not
consider opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the government's
'official seal of approval on one religious view.'" Id.
72. Id. at 791. "In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years,
there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become
part of the fabric of our society." Id. at 792.
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The different tests that the Supreme Court has applied to
Establishment Clause challenges have led to considerable confusion
for lower courts attempting to extract a clear standard to apply. One
particular area involves school prayers and moments of silence. Courts
have generally agreed that the proper standard for analyzing prayer
in schools and moment of silence statutes is the Lemon test.
IV. THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES
Many Establishment Clause cases have been brought
concerning the appropriate role of religion in the public schools.
Critics of religion in public schools have long argued for the need to
maintain a strict separation between church and state in that context
based on the unique role of public education in American society. 73
Indeed, the Court declared public schools to be the "symbol of our
democracy" where divisive forces, like religion, have no place. 74 In
addition, the need to separate church and state is all the more
pressing in public schools because children are impressionable. It was
not until 1962, however, that the Court considered one of the most
prominent displays of religious activity in public schools-school
75
prayer.
In Engel v. Vitale, the Court struck down a state law 76
requiring a daily prayer to be conducted in public schools, firmly
disposing of the possibility of state-mandated prayer activities in
public schools. 77 The Court did not use the Lemon test in Engel,
because Lemon v. Kurtzman had not yet been decided. Instead, the
Court relied on a historical analysis of the Establishment Clause to
support its decision. 78 Reasoning that many colonists left England

73.

Mary Ellen Quinn Johnson, School Prayer and the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48

MD. L. REV. 1018, 1027-28 (1989).

74. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
75. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
76. The New York State Board of Regents composed the following prayer to be read aloud at
the beginning of each day: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
77. Id.; see also id. at 425 (stating that "the constitutional prohibition against laws
respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as part of a religious program carried on by government"). The Court also stated that "[i]t
is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country
should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely
religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious
guidance." Id. at 435.
78.

Id. at 425.
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because of the "very practice of establishing governmentally composed
prayers for religious services," the Court stated:
[T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion
must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as part of a
79
religious program carried on by government.

In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,8 0 another
pre-Lemon case, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania 1 and Maryland statutes8 2 requiring school officials to
conduct daily Bible readings but making participation by students
completely voluntary. Justice Clark, writing for the majority,
articulated the following test to determine whether the government
had violated the Establishment Clause: "[W]hat are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment?"8 3 If the answer to either part of
the question is that government "advances" or "inhibits" religion,
84
Justice Clark stated, then the activity violates the First Amendment.
After finding that both laws promoted religion because the activity
constituted a "religious ceremony" and because the state intended this
result, the Court then reiterated its adherence to a position of
neutrality in Establishment Clause cases.8 5 In an important
concurrence, Justice Brennan observed that a statute mandating a

79. Id.
80. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
81. The text of Pennsylvania's statute reads as follows:
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such
Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent
or guardian.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (Purdon 1992). Additionally, the school district added the
requirement that a recitation of the Lord's Prayer follow the readings from the Bible. Schempp,
374 U.S. at 208.
82. The rule adopted by the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore, Maryland read as
follows:
Opening Exercises. Each school, either collectively or in classes, shall be opened by
the reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the
Lord's Prayer. The Douay version may be used by those pupils who prefer it.
Appropriate patriotic exercises should be held as a part of the general opening
exercise of the school or class. Any child shall be excused from participating in the
opening exercises or from attending the opening exercises upon the written request of
his parent or guardian.
Id. at 211-12.
83. Id. at 222.
84. Id. This two-part test was incorporated into the three-part Lemon test that later became
the standard applied in Establishment Clause cases. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
85. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-24 (speaking of "wholesome neutrality"); see also id. at 225
(discussing the fear of a rising "breach in neutrality").
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moment of silence might survive a constitutional challenge. Therefore,
with the end of the debate over the proper role of prayer in schools,
the controversy shifted toward moment of silence statutes.
V.

MOMENT OF SILENCE STATUTES

Almost immediately after the Court struck down school prayer
statutes, many state legislatures enacted moment of silence statutes.
Several of these statutes were "pure" moment of silence laws, stating
only that the period of silence was to be used for the purpose of
meditation.8 6 A majority of the statutes, however, provided that the
time could be used for either meditation or prayer.8 7 Although lower
courts were strongly divided over the constitutionality of the two
versions of moment of silence laws, they have been consistent in
striking down statutes that appear to have the purpose of encouraging
88
prayer in public schools.
A. Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)

The only instance in which the Court has considered the
constitutionality of a moment of silence statute occurred in 1985 in
Wallace v. Jaffree.8

9

In Wallace, three separate Alabama statutes were

issue. 90

at
The first required a period of silence to be "observed for
meditation." 9' The district court upheld the validity of this statute,
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Michie Supp. 1984).
87. § 16-1-201.
88. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 71 (1985). The district court in Gaines v.
Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976), upheld the following statute:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that
a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for
meditation or prayer, and during any such period silence shall be maintained and no
activities engaged in.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 1A (West 1996). However, the district court in Duffy v. Las
Cruces Pub. Schs., 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983), struck down New Mexico's statute: "Each
local school board may authorize a period of silence not to exceed one minute at the beginning of
the school day. This period may be used for contemplation, meditation or prayer, provided that
silence is maintained and no activities are undertaken." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.1 (Michie
1978).
89. 472 U.S. at 38.
90. Id. at 38, 40.
91. The text of the 1978 statute read as follows:
At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the sixth grades
in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held
shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be
observed for meditation, and during any such period silence shall be maintained and
no activities engaged in.
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and before reaching the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs abandoned the
claim that this "pure" moment of silence
statute was
unconstitutional. 92 Under the second statute, teachers were allowed to
"lead willing students" in an open prayer in the classroom. 93 In a
separate decision, the Court held that the statute was clearly
invalid. 94 Finally, the third statute permitted a period of silence to be
"observed for meditation or voluntary prayer." 95 Using the Lemon test,
the Wallace Court struck down this third statute on the grounds that
there was substantial evidence demonstrating that Alabama's
96
legislature had not enacted the statute for a clearly secular purpose.
However, the Court also strongly indicated that a statute providing for
a "pure" moment of silence would not be a violation of the
Establishment Clause, because it would protect a student's right to
engage in voluntary prayer during a moment of silence without
establishing religion. 97
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Michie Supp. 1984).
92. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40.
93. The text of the statute reads as follows:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution within
the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any
homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students in prayer, or may lead
the willing students in the following prayer to God: "Almighty God, You alone are our
God. We acknowledge You as the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your
justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen,
in the counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms
of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen."
§ 16-1-20.2.
94. Wallace, 466 U.S. 924 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("As I understand it, the order
this Court enters today is a holding that Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 is invalid as repugnant to the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
95. The text of the statute reads as follows:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools
the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held may announce that a
period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation
or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall be engaged
in.
§ 16-1-20.1 (repealed 1998).
96. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. At an evidentiary hearing held by the district court, Alabama
State Senator Donald G. Holmes, who identified himself as the " 'prime sponsor'" of the bill that
would become section 16-1-20.1, stated unequivocally that the bill was indeed an " 'effort to
return voluntary prayer to our public schools. . . . [I]t is a beginning and a step in the right
direction.' " Id. at 43. Moreover, Senator Holmes further testified that he had "'no other purpose
in mind.' " Id. (citation omitted).
97. See id. at 58-59 (comparing sections 16-1-20 and 16-1-20.1 and noting that the only
significant textual difference was the addition of the words "or voluntary prayer," leading to the
conclusion that the purpose of enacting section 16-1-20.1 was to bring prayer back into public
schools); see also id. at 59 ("The legislative intent to return prayer to the public school is, of
course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer
during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day.").
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The concurring opinions in Wallace further support the idea
that a "pure" moment of silence statute (and perhaps even one not as
"pure") would be found constitutional. In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor stated that although the Alabama statute at issue was
unconstitutional, other moment of silence statutes might be valid. 98
The Alabama law was struck down only because the legislative history
accompanying the statute showed that it clearly lacked a secular
purpose. 99 Maintaining that a moment of silence statute is not
inherently religious, Justice O'Connor further declared that even a
statute specifying prayer as a permissible activity would not be
unconstitutional solely based on that specification.10 0 In a concurrence,
Justice Powell also stated that some moment of silence statutes could
be constitutional and that he would have upheld the Alabama statute
mentioning prayer if Alabama's legislature had articulated a clearly
secular purpose for its enactment.101
B. Post-Wallace
Following the Wallace decision, lower courts have also applied
the Lemon test to more recent moment of silence statute cases.' 0 2
Because the Wallace Court did not proceed to examine the second and
third prongs of the Lemon test after determining that Alabama's
statute failed to meet the first prong, however, lower courts have
emphasized this first element. Once a statute has been deemed either
to satisfy or fail the requirement that the law was enacted for a clearly
secular purpose, the second and third prongs receive rather cursory
treatment, as though the first prong were dispositive.

98. Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Court does not hold that the Establishment
Clause is so hostile to religion that it precludes the States from affording schoolchildren an
opportunity for voluntary silent prayer, [and] .. .the moment of silence statutes of many States
should satisfy the Establishment Clause standard.").
99. Id. at 78 ("Given this evidence in the record, candor requires us to admit that this
Alabama statute was intended to convey a message of state encouragement and endorsement of
religion.").
100. Id. at 73 ("Even if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently during a
quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives.");
id. at 76 ("A moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit
prayer, meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing one
alternative over the others, should pass [the endorsement] test.").
101. Id. at 62, 66 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 66 (noting that a pure moment of
silence statute was unlikely to either advance or inhibit religion).
102. See Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 277 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996
(2001); Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997).
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1. May v. Cooperman (1985)
Six months after the Court's ruling in Wallace, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit struck down New Jersey's moment of
silence statute allowing for "contemplation" or "introspection" in May
v. Cooperman.10 3 Focusing on the text of the statute, the court
determined that the statute provided only that teachers should
10 4
permit, but not require, the students to observe a moment of silence.
After noting that the most difficult part of the case was determining
whether the law passed the first prong of the Lemon test, the court
10 5
proceeded to conduct a detailed application of this first element.
Although the court acknowledged that the statutory text was facially
neutral because it did not specify prayer as a possible activity, it
accepted the district court's finding that the statute had been enacted
for a religious, not a secular, purpose.1 0 6 Although the district court
was unable to examine the statute's legislative history in making this
none had been recorded-the Court
determination-because
nevertheless noted the legislature's past efforts to bring religion back
into the public schools as an indication that this moment of silence
statute was an attempt to do the same. 10 7 Thus, despite the fact that
the statute was facially neutral and that there was an absence of
legislative history to show that the law was not enacted for a secular
purpose, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that
10 8
the New Jersey statute failed the first prong of the Lemon test.
Although the court was not required to examine the other
prongs of the Lemon test-because it had already decided that the
statute failed the first prong, it nevertheless did so. The court
determined that the application of the statute did not have the effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. 10 9 Furthermore, the Third Circuit

103. 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 246.
105. Id. at 250.
106. Id. at 251 (pointing to the fact that "the district court relied heavily upon evidence
suggesting that the silent minute has no legitimate pedagogical value").
107. Id. at 251-52.
108. Id. at 253.
109. Id. at 250. The school principal had sent out the following memorandum to facilitate the
implementation of the statute:
We will observe one minute of seated silence in each homeroom at the very beginning
of the opening exercises. You will note that the Bill says students shall be permitted
to observe a minute of silence. That will be interpreted to mean that there will be a
minute of silence in the classroom so that each student may use that time as the
individual interprets his or her desire to do so. This means that there will be no
talking and no movement about the room. Each student will remain seated in his or
her seat during the one minute period. At the conclusion of the one minute, students
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held that there was no excessive entanglement because the students
were only allowed a moment of silence but were not required to
observe the moment of silence in a religious manner. 110 However,
despite the fact that New Jersey's statute did not advance or inhibit
religion and did not involve an excessive entanglement of the state
with religion, the law was declared invalid because it had failed the
first prong requiring a secular legislative purpose.1 '
2. Bown v. Gwinnett County School District (1997)
In Bown v. Gwinnett County School District,11 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia's Moment of Quiet
Reflection in Schools Act 1 3 was constitutional. The statute provides
for a period of "quiet reflection" to be observed at the beginning of each
school day.11 4 Additionally, the statutory text specifically states that
the time period is not intended to be used to conduct a religious
service. 11 5 Thus, it is a "pure" moment of silence statute because it
does not even mention prayer as a possible activity.
In analyzing the statute, the court carefully reviewed both the
plain text and the legislative history of the statute as required by the
first prong of the Lemon test and determined that the statute had a
clearly secular purpose.1 6 The court noted that the preamble of the
statute itself stated that the secular purpose was to provide students
will be asked to rise and participate in the Pledge, and the remainder of the
homeroom procedure will continue as in the past.
Id. at 248 (alteration in original).
110. Id. at 247.

111. Id. at 253.
112. 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997).
113. The text of the statute reads as follows:
Brief period of quiet reflection authorized; nature of period.
(a) In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge shall, at the opening of
school upon every school day, conduct a brief period of quiet reflection for not more
than 60 seconds with the participation of all the pupils therein assembled.
(b) The moment of quiet reflection authorized by subsection (a) of this Code section is
not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise but
shall be considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection on the
anticipated activities of the day.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section shall not prevent
student initiated voluntary school prayers at schools or school related events which
are nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1996).
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1471 ("The Act's legislative history, although somewhat conflicting, is
not inconsistent with the express statutory language articulating a clear secular purpose and
disclaiming a religious purpose.").
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with an opportunity to engage in quiet reflection that Georgia's
117
legislature believed would benefit them in "today's hectic society."'
Additionally, the court specifically noted that the statute did not
mention prayer as a possible activity. 118 Rather, it provided only for a"
'brief period of quiet reflection.' "119
After examining the statutory text, the court then turned to the
statute's legislative history.' 20 Senator David Scott maintained that he
121
had introduced the Act as part of an effort to curb juvenile violence.
Senator Scott stated that he believed that providing an opportunity for
quiet reflection at the start of each school day "would help to combat
violence among Georgia's students." 122 While Senator Scott introduced
evidence showing that several members of the legislature had
indicated their desire to reinstate school prayer with this bill, other
legislators believed that the bill had nothing to do with prayer or
religion. 123 Faced with this conflicting legislative history, the court
determined that the facially neutral language tipped the balance
24
toward a finding that the statute did have a clearly secular purpose.
In considering the second prong of the Lemon test, the court
analyzed the implementation and application of the statute and
concluded that the law neither advanced nor inhibited religion. 25 The
court noted that the announcement of each day's moment of silence by
the school's principal called only for a reflection upon the day's
activities and did not promote using the period of silence for any

117. Id. at 1469; see also Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act, Act No. 770, § 1, 1994
Ga. Laws 256, 256 (1994). The Act's uncodified preamble states:
The General Assembly finds that in "today's hectic society," all too few of our citizens
are able to experience even a moment of quiet reflection before plunging headlong into
the day's activities. Our young citizens are particularly affected by this absence of an
opportunity for a moment of quiet reflection. The General Assembly finds that our
young, and society as a whole, would be well served if students were afforded a
moment of quiet reflection at the beginning of each day in the public schools.
118. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1469 & n.3.
119. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050(a) (1996)).

120. Id. at 1471.
121. Id. at 1467.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1471.
124. Id. at 1472.
[Elven if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that religious speech in
particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate the
Act, because what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly
religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.
Id. at 1471-72 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
125. Id. at 1473 (upholding the statute "so long as the quiet reflection exercise is conducted
in the manner prescribed").
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particular activity. 126 Furthermore, the court reasoned that there was
no government pressure to engage in any religious activity because
students were not required to pray during the period-they were only
required to be silent. 127 The Eleventh Circuit briefly mentioned the
coercion test when it admitted that it was not sure how to apply the
coercion test in conjunction with the Lemon test. 128 Nevertheless, the
court briefly stated that some of its members believed that a showing
of coercion was sufficient but not necessary to constitute a violation of
129
the Establishment Clause.
With regard to the third prong of the Lemon test, the court
easily disposed of the third prong of the Lemon test by determining
that there was no excessive entanglement between government and
religion. 30 The teachers were not required to participate in, or to lead,
prayers. 1 3 1 In addition, the teachers were not placed in a situation that
required them to review the content of any prayers made silently by
the students during the moment of quiet reflection. In fact, it would be
impossible for teachers to tell whether the children were actually
praying during the silence. 132 Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision
to uphold Georgia's moment of silence statute, the plaintiffs did not
apply for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
3. Brown v. Gilmore (2001)
In Brown v. Gilmore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld Virginia's moment of silence statute. 133 In contrast to

126. Id. at 1472.
127. Id. at 1473 (stating that the facts of the case "do not indicate that the state has created
a situation in which students are faced with public pressure or peer pressure to participate in
religious activity").
128. Id. at 1473 n.ll.
129. Id. at 1473.
130. Id. at 1474.

131. Id.
132. Id. (considering Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1996),
in which the court found that excessive entanglement occurred because school administrators
had participated in and reviewed the content of prayers).
133. 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001). The amended statute reads as follows:
In order that the right of every pupil to the free exercise of religion be guaranteed
within the schools and that the freedom of each individual pupil be subject to the least
possible pressure from the Commonwealth either to engage in, or to refrain from,
religious observation on school grounds, the school board of each school division shall
establish the daily observance of one minute of silence in each classroom of the
division.
During such one-minute period of silence, the teacher responsible for each
classroom shall take care that all pupils remain seated and silent and make no
distracting display to the end that each pupil may, in the exercise of his or her
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Georgia's moment of silence statute, Virginia's statute specifically
mentioned prayer as an optional activity that students may engage in
during the silent period. 134
In examining the first prong of the Lemon test, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the statute had two purposes: one,
meditation, was clearly secular; the other, prayer, could be considered
secular, even though it involved religion.135 The court determined that
a statute with dual legitimate goals did not violate the Constitution
simply because one of the statute's purposes involved religion. 136 After
examining the text's plain meaning, the court stated that the law
provided a neutral environment in which students could engage in
either religious or nonreligious activity.137
Turning its attention to the legislative history of the statute,
the court reasoned that the evidence was insufficient to alter the
conclusion from the plain text that the statute had a clearly secular
purpose.1 38 The sponsor of the bill, Virginia Senator Warren Barry,
explained that he had introduced the bill in response to the school
shootings that had occurred throughout the United States, Senator
Stephen Newman stated that he hoped the periods of silence would
decrease the students' desire to resort to violence.' 39 In explaining the
motivation behind specifying "meditation, prayer and reflection" as
possible activities in which the students could engage during the
minute of silence, Newman stated that these options were examples of

individual choice, meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity which does not
interfere with, distract, or impede other pupils in the like exercise of individual choice.
The Office of the Attorney General shall intervene and shall provide legal defense
of this law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (Michie 2000).
134. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1996), with VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (Michie

2000).
135. Brown, 258 F.3d at 276 ('To the extent that the minute of silence is designed to permit
nonreligious meditation, it clearly has a nonreligious purpose. And to the extent it is designed to
permit students to pray, it accommodates religion."). The court further noted that
accommodating religion "is itself a secular purpose in that it fosters the liberties secured by the
Constitution." Id.
136. Id. at 277. "We need not find that the purpose be 'exclusively secular.' " Id. at 276 (citing
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984)).
137. Id. at 276 (reading the statute to mean that the "minute of silence is explicitly offered
to the students for any nondistracting purpose-religious or nonreligious-including prayer or
meditation").
138. Id. at 277 ("The superintendent of Virginia's schools noted that in her experience, a
moment of silence has proved to be 'a good classroom management tool' because it 'works as a
good transition, enabling students to pause, settle down, compose themselves and focus on the
day ahead' making for 'a better school day.' ').
139. Id. at 271.
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what students could do during the period. 140 Senator Newman
maintained that, without providing any examples, the moment of
silence would potentially have no purpose at all.' 4 ' Prayer was
included not because the state was trying to endorse it, but rather
because the state was trying to avoid discriminating against it.142
After determining that the statute had a clearly secular
purpose, the court stated that "the final two prongs of the Lemon test
need not detain us long."' 43 The court held that the second prong of the
Lemon test-that the statute neither advance nor hinder religionwas satisfied because the statute allowed both religious and
nonreligious practices of reflection and silence. 44 The fact that the
statute had the potential effect of conveying to some students that the
state was promoting prayer was insufficient by itself to render the
45
facially neutral statute unconstitutional.1
Finally, the court held that the state had not become
excessively entangled with religion by enacting this statute. 146 The
court determined that by specifying that prayer was a permissible
activity, along with meditation and reflection, the state actually was
disentangling itself from religion. 47 Instead of requiring students to
openly ask a teacher if they could pray silently and requiring the
teacher to answer affirmatively, the students would know that
praying was allowed. 148 Thus, the court held that, in fact, the only
49
thing that the statute established was a neutral moment of silence.'
After determining that the statute withstood the scrutiny of
the Lemon test, the court further declared that the statute was not
coercive in nature, because only the student knows whether she is
praying during the moment of silence. 150 Therefore, the state cannot

140. Id.
141. Id. at 271-72.
142. Id. at 272.
143. Id. at 277.

144. Id. The statute was implemented by the teacher of each classroom, who, in accordance
with a memorandum from the school board, would say: "As we begin another day, let us pause
for a moment of silence." Id. at 272.
145. Id. at 278 (establishing that "speculative fears as to the potential effects of this statute
cannot be used to strike down a statute that on its face is neutral between religious and
nonreligious activity").
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

149. Id. at 281 (noting that just as the "short period of quiet serves the religious interests of
those students who wish to pray silently, it serves the secular interests of those who do not wish
to do so").
150. Id. at 278, 281.
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be accused of forcing students to engage in religious activity.1 51 The
state is merely requiring students to be quiet, which is clearly within
152
the prerogative of public school officials.
In his opinion denying an injunction during a pending petition
for a writ of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist indicated that, if considered
by the Supreme Court, the Virginia statute would be deemed
constitutional. 153 Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Virginia statute
was presumptively valid. 154 Relying on the Fourth Circuit's
determination that the Virginia statute had a clearly secular purpose,
Justice Rehnquist stated that this fact alone might be sufficient to
1 55
distinguish the case from the Court's earlier results in Wallace.
Justice Rehnquist also reminded the Court of Justice O'Connor's and
Justice Powell's concurring opinions in Wallace indicating their
willingness to uphold moment of silence statutes that contained the
156
word "prayer" as a possible option.
C. Analysis
As the three cases that have reached the federal courts of
appeals since the Supreme Court's decision in Wallace demonstrate,
lower courts have dutifully followed the Wallace Court's lead in using
the Lemon test to determine the constitutionality of moment of silence
statutes. 157 Although the Lemon standard is the appropriate test to
apply, this Note posits that courts should balance their analyses of the
three prongs of the Lemon test more evenly.
It is apparent from the principal moment of silence cases that
the primary hurdle for the state in Establishment Clause challenges is
the secular purpose requirement.15 8 The Wallace and May Courts
struck down two moment of silence statutes because the relevant laws
lacked a clear secular purpose.1 59 The Wallace Court found it
unnecessary to continue with the Lemon test because the statute

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2001).
154. Id. at 1303 (noting that it would only allow injunctive relief under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), to be used "sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent
circumstances").
155. Id.
156. Id.

157. See Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 277 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996
(2001); Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997); May v. Cooperman,
780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
158. Id.
159. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); May, 780 F.2d at 251.
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failed to satisfy the first prong. 160 The May Court briefly examined the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test and found that the statute
would have satisfied those criteria. 161 On the other hand, the courts in
Bown and Brown, upheld two moment of silence laws because the
16 2
courts determined that the statutes did have a secular purpose.
Neither court analyzed the second or third prong of the Lemon test as
extensively as it did the first prong, but further analysis of the second
and third prongs of the Lemon test found that both requirements were
easily satisfied.1 6 3 Both courts also briefly discussed the coercion
element, although neither seemed to know exactly how to incorporate
it into the Lemon test.1 64 Only Brown v. Gilmore has been appealed to
the Supreme Court. 6 5 By refusing to grant a writ of certiorari in
Brown, the Supreme Court left standing a statute that allowed public
schools to implement a moment of silence and specifying prayer as a
permissible activity in which students may engage during the
period.166
Courts have placed too much emphasis on the first prong of the
Lemon test and have overlooked the second and third prongs of the
analysis. The first prong of the Lemon test demands that a statute be
enacted for a clearly secular purpose. 16 7 To analyze this prong, courts
look to the statutory text and to its legislative history. 68 The inherent
difficulty with this prong of the test, however, is that it is subject to
legislative manipulation. It is relatively easy to draft a facially neutral
statute so that the true purpose in passing the law is clouded in
secular rhetoric.
In addition, an examination of the statute's legislative history
often provides a blurred view of the true motivation behind the
enactment of the law. Legislators, knowing they must refrain from
openly asserting that a statute is being passed to bring religion into
public schools, may surreptitiously cite a secular purpose as the
reason for the creation of a law. Furthermore, a legislature is
composed of many unique individuals, and it may be difficult to
160. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (noting that there was no need to analyze the second or third
prongs of the Lemon test where the statute had failed the first prong).
161. May, 780 F.2d at 247, 250.
162. Brown, 258 F.3d at 277; Bown, 112 F.3d at 1471-72.
163. See Brown, 258 F.3d at 277-78; Bown, 112 F.3d at 1472-74.
164. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1473 n.l (admitting that it is unclear how the coercion test
comports with the Lemon test but deciding to include it in the second (effects) prong analysis);
Brown, 258 F.3d at 281 (declaring that the moment of silence statute was not coercive).
165. Brown v. Gilmore, No. 01-384, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10022 (Oct. 29, 2001).
166. Id.
167. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
168. Id.
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establish a single, unitary legislative intent. Sometimes it may be
unclear why some individuals vote in favor of a law while others do
not. The motivation may involve religious convictions, entirely secular
reasons, or some combination of the two.
Therefore, the first prong of the Lemon test should not be the
sole focus of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, because as long as
the statute's text is facially neutral and the legislative history
provides an indication of a secular purpose, a statute will pass the
first prong.
Courts should instead focus on the second (effects) and third
(excessive entanglement) prongs of the Lemon analysis. These prongs
are logically linked, and as such, should be combined into a single test.
The second prong prohibits a statute from having the primary effect of
either advancing or inhibiting religion, 169 while the third prong
demands that the government not become excessively entangled with
religious activity. 170 These concepts are inextricably linked: advancing
or inhibiting religion invariably entangles a state with religion.
The dominant inquiry should be whether the effect of the
statute is to advance or inhibit religion in such a way as to result in
students feeling compelled to engage in, or observe, religious activity.
Those who choose to participate in religious activity should be allowed
to do so. By the same token, those who do not wish to engage in
religious exercises should be protected as well. The element of coercion
would fit well into this model, as a showing that a statute promoted an
environment which forced students to participate in religious activity
would clearly invalidate the law as advancing religion.
Using this type of analysis, state moment of silence statutes
(both those that specifically mention prayer and those that do not), do
not appear to violate the Establishment Clause. Rather, these statutes
offer a compromise for those who advocate a strict separation of
church and state and those who desire a prominent place for religion
in public schools. The application of the first part of the revised Lemon
test likely would result in a determination that moment of silence
statutes have a clearly secular purpose. Both types of moment of
silence statutes are facially neutral. A moment of silence law that does
not mention prayer is clearly neutral on its face. Even a moment of
silent statute that provides an opportunity for prayer and other
activities such as meditation or reflection as examples of activities in
which students may engage during the quiet time, is facially neutral.
A statute should not be invalidated simply because it specifies prayer

169. Id. at 612.
170. Id. at 613.
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as a potential activity. Instead, this acknowledgement of prayer
should be considered in light of the context in which it is offered, as an
illustration of an acceptable activity. If a statute offered only prayer as
an option, perhaps the statute would cease to be facially neutral.
A combination of the second and third prongs of the Lemon test
should be the primary focus of the analysis. Does the statute have the
actual effect of forcing students to participate in prayer or the
apparent effect of government promoting prayer in public schools? The
two parts of the question are one and the same. If government is
perceived as endorsing prayer, it can really only do so if students feel
as though they are compelled to pray while the moment of silence is
being observed. Similarly, if students feel as though they must pray
during the moment of silence, then the government must be perceived
as endorsing prayer.
A moment of silence statute does neither of the above, because
it only requires that a student remain quiet during the silent period; it
does not force a student to engage in religious activity. Obviously, it is
well within a school's right to require students to be quiet for a time
during classes. Whether the student chooses to pray during that
moment of silence is irrelevant, because the student's thoughts are
private and are not observable by others. Moment of silence statutes
represent a compromise, in that they allow religion to occupy a role in
public schools that does not violate a student's right to be free from
religious coercion. The moment of silence statutes neither advance nor
inhibit religion and therefore do not excessively involve government in
the area of religion.
This new approach should satisfy those who oppose the
moment of silence statutes as well as those who currently support
them. Instead of being viewed as yet another battleground in the
continuing war to keep religion out of public schools, the statutes
should be viewed as a viable compromise for both sides. A policy of
accommodation, an early mark in Establishment Clause cases, is an
adequate tool to be used in these cases.
Those who support the notion of a strict separation of church
and state should have no objections to a statute that is facially neutral
in both its text and in its application. Moment of silence statutes,
although once enacted to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on
prayer, can now be enacted to give children a time to think in peace.
Encouraging youth to reflect upon matters, or merely allowing them a
moment of quiet, is a legitimate, secular purpose, and one that should
not be disregarded simply because earlier statutes had the express
legislative purpose of introducing religious activities in the public
school arena. That the statute nevertheless might have the incidental
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effect of providing a moment during school hours in which children
may engage in religious activity should not lead to invalidation. A
child who prays during the moment of silence is not forcing another
child to join in this prayer.
Individuals who wish public schools to welcome religious
activities openly should also be satisfied with a moment of silence
statute. While the state does not provide guidance in this religious
activity, it is nevertheless allowing a time during which the child may
engage in the activity if he so chooses. Indeed, it is not the state's
responsibility to teach students religion, as that option properly rests
with the child's family. Thus, in striking a balance between these two
competing groups, moment of silence statutes offer a compromise that
affords the recognition of the need to accommodate religion in public
schools.
V. CONCLUSION

The proper role of religion in public schools continues to be a
topic of debate. While some contend that a complete separation
between church and state is required by the Constitution, others
argue that the Constitution allows religion to play a role in public
education. After school prayer statutes were overwhelmingly struck
down by the courts, state legislatures responded by enacting moment
of silence statutes. Although the early moment of silence statutes were
enacted with the goal of reintroducing prayer to the classroom, state
legislatures' more recent enactments do not reflect this same purpose.
Moment of silence statutes, when written and applied in a neutral
fashion, provide a compromise between those who desire a complete
separation of government and religion and those who do not.
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